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Abstract	 ﾠ
Most of  the world’s water entitlement and allocation regimes evolved during 
periods of abundance and, hence, are not well suited to the management of water 
scarcity. Development of the institutional arrangements necessary to manage 
changing demands and supplies is in its infancy. 
Design criteria for the development of a set of institutional arrangements for the 
robust management of scarce water resources is offered and then used to develop 
a generic framework for the allocation and use of water. Variations to account for 
differences in ground, regulated and unregulated water resources are offered. The 
question of how best to sequence reform of existing water entitlement and 
allocation regimes is also addressed. 
The result is a recommendation for the use of water sharing plans to determine 
how much water may be used at any point in time and an unbundled suite of 
arrangements that enable efficient but separated management of long term and 
short term considerations and, also, the control of externalities. 
System-wide adjustment is facilitated through the periodic revision of water sharing 
plans. Individual adjustment to changing circumstances is facilitated through trade 
in entitlements and allocations. 
Before the introduction of institutional arrangements that encourage adjustment 
through trade it is recommended that the abstraction regime used be converted 
into one that accounts for return flows and allocates water according to 
shareholder entitlement. Seniority, beneficial-use criteria and opportunities to third 
parties to prevent adjustment according to pre-specified rules should be repealed. 
Well-designed regimes can be extended to include dam-capacity shares and allow 
the use of market-based instruments in delivery of water-quality objectives. Pooling 
can be used to lower the costs of risk management. 
1. Introduction	 ﾠ
If there is anything that is certain about water, it is that demand for access to it 
and the maximum amount that can be taken sustain-ably at any point in time 
must be expected to change. The search for the most appropriate way to 
supply access to scarce water is now part of the global water agenda. 
As the clock ticks on, an increasing number of nations are becoming aware of the 
pressures that ever-changing economic conditions, ever-changing technologies, 
population growth and ongoing climatic change are placing on their water 
management regimes. In many countries, social preferences for arrangements 
that return health to degraded wetlands, rivers and aquifers are on the increase 
(Young, 2013). With a James Bond like wit, Catley-Carlson (2009) describes this suite of 
pressures and challenges as a cocktail to be stirred carefully. 
“Take one world already being exhausted by 6 billion people. Find the 
ingredients to feed another 2 billion people. Add demand for more food, more 
animal feed and more fuel. Use only the same amount of water the planet has 
had since creation. And don’t forget to restore the environment that sustains 
us. Stir very carefully.” (Catley-Carlson, 2009, p.2) 
Drawing attention to the global importance of preparing to deal with these 
challenges, the OECD (2009) warns that, by 2030, over half the people living in 
the world will be reliant upon access to stressed water resources. 
At any point in time and place, the bottom line is that administrators  should 
expect  that,  even  if  the  water  use  they  are responsible for looks “very 
right” today, in a few decades’ time the way this water is used will be very 
different. 
Given the reality of changing supply and demand conditions, how should one 
think about the design of a regime that determines who is entitled to access 
water and, in times of scarcity, how access is to be rationed? 
 
 
Box 1: Definitions 
System: A connected set of water bodies which may include 
streams, lakes, rivers and aquifers. 
Regulated water system: A system where the flow of water can be controlled by 
determining when and how much water is released from dams and/or allowed to flow 
over control weirs and other similar structures. 
Unregulated water system: A stream or river where there is little or no opportunity 
to control the rate of flow. Unregulated streams and rivers typically have no dams, 
weirs or locks that enable the rate of flow from one reach to another to be 
manipulated. 
Abstraction regime: The constellation of mechanisms (entitlements, allocations licenses, 
permits, etc.) used to determine who, when, how and how much water may be abstracted 
from a water resource pool. 
Entitlement: A long-term interest in or entitlement to receive allocations or be allowed to 
abstract water from a water body. 
Allocation: A defined once-off opportunity to take water from a water body. Usually 
defined as a volume. Sometimes defined as  a  maximum  rate  per  hour  when 
flow  conditions  allow abstraction. 
Return flow: The water physically withdrawn from a system and returned back to the 
same or a different water body following use. Many towns abstract water for drinking, 
washing and flushing purposes and return the majority of this water to a water body 
following use. Similarly, many industries abstract water for cooling purposes and then 
return it back to a river after use. Irrigation is often associated with the return of a 
significant proportion of abstracted water back to a river or aquifer. 
Over-allocated: A water body with entitlements which if fully exercised would result in a 
rate of abstraction that is greater than that which can be sustained. Over-used: A water body where the quantity being abstracted is greater than that which 
can be sustained. 
 
 
2. Proposition	 ﾠ
The main proposition put forward in this paper is the observation that in order to 
manage this forthcoming cocktail of challenges, most countries will need to 
revise the ways that water entitlements, water allocations, use permits, etc. are 
defined. Almost all abstraction regimes that one can find around the world 
evolved during periods of relative water abundance and where rapid changes 
in technology were not common. 
When viewed from this perspective, in many cases, it will be more efficient to 
replace the existing abstraction management regime with one that is designed 
specifically to enable the cost effective management of the many challenges 
that increasing water scarcity brings to a region. Meinzen-Dick (2013) reviews 
abstraction reform challenges for developing countries. 
3. Water	 ﾠentitlement	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠ
In this paper, the term “abstraction management regime” is used in preference to 
the more common “water-right” terminology (see Box 1). See Grafton and Horne 
(2014) for more detail on water rights terminology, especially for Australia. The 
water-right literature is complex and built on legal traditions that discourage the 
development of new precedents. When one uses baggage free language, 
discussion focuses on the concept and tends to leave preconceived notions 
behind. 
In most countries, abstraction management regimes used have their roots in 
century old traditions and in laws that are regarded as sacrosanct (Meinzen-
Dick, 2013). In recent years, however, a few countries have chosen to totally 
re-specify the way entitlements to access water are specified. Examples 
include Australia (Young, 2010), Chile (Bauer, 1998) and South Africa 
(Nieuwoudt and Backeberger, 2010). 
From 1994 onwards, Australia has been replacing its traditional water licensing 
regimes with a new suite of water sharing regime (COAG, 2004) that have 
enabled entitlement and allocation markets to emerge (NWC, 2011). 
In 1981, Chile introduced a new market-based framework for the allocation and 
management of water (Bauer, 2012). 
Other  countries,  like  China  and  the  UK,  are  contemplating changing their 
entitlement regimes and, in particular, making them more conducive to the 
emergence of markets that enable people to take advantage of the opportunities 
that change create (DEFRA, 2011; Young, 2012a). Wu et al. (2014) describe a 
new approach to basin-scale water resources management based on an 
evapotranspiration management approach. 
The reasons for pursuing each of these reforms involve a mix of economic, 
environmental and social considerations. Australia began with an economic 
reform agenda that was quickly coupled with recognition of the need to resolve 
a suite of environmental problems. Chile, too, began with a focus on the role of water in economic development. South Africa recognized the need to include 
water entitlement reform in the arrangements needed to escape from a 
socially repressive apartheid regime. When one reviews the experience of these 
countries, it quickly becomes clear that no country got the sequence of reforms 
right. In each of the cases outlined above, countries have made serious 
mistakes from which other countries can learn (see, for example, Bauer, 2004, 
2012; Young, 2010, 2012b; Bjornlund et al., 2012; Grafton et al., 2011). 
The United Kingdom has recognized that it needs to include entitlement reform 
in the suite of arrangements needed for it to comply with the European 
Community water framework directives for it to improve the health of many of 
its water systems with-out adverse economic impacts (DEFRA, 2011). China has 
recognized that water markets and very different management arrangements 
will be needed if it is to avoid massive water scarcity problems that would be 
politically unacceptable and has introduced legislation that will enable trading 
to emerge as a means to manage water scarcity (Liu and Bin, 2003; Huaixi and 
Luo, 2009). 
4. Concepts	 ﾠ
From first principles, how should one think about designing an administrative 
regime that specifies entitlements, makes allocations and controls water use? 
The  first  design  clue  comes  from  the  Tinbergen  Principle. Tinbergen 
(1952), who among other things was awarded the first Nobel Prize in 
Economics, was interested in policy arrangements that would produce outcomes 
that are dynamically efficient. That is, the constellation of instruments used 
would produce efficient and equitable outcomes through time and across space 
AND do this continuously without a need to revise them. Focusing on this 
idealized state, he observed that the number of instruments used to pursue 
policy targets matters. 
If one wishes to use a market to deliver efficient outcomes through time, 
there should be as many instruments as there are targets (objectives). 
Applied to water, this means that water access arrangements need to be 
separated into their component parts. Rather than a single abstraction licence, a 
bundle of licence, permitting and planning arrangements are needed. Each of 
these instruments can then be used to pursue different objectives and, where 
appropriate, operate at different scales. Drawing from the notion that a property 
right is usually best described as a bundle of opportunities and obligations, the 
process of separating an authorization to abstract water at a specific location, 
for a specific use and in a specified manner is often called “unbundling”. 
In unbundled regimes, as are now used widely in Australia, separate instruments 
and separate institutional arrangements are used to pursue separate targets 
(NWC, 2011). In the best of these unbundled regimes, water licences have been 
replaced with shares that entitle their holder to a proportion of any allocations 
made to a defined pool of water (Young and McColl, 2003a). Allocations are 
made to this pool and distributed to shareholders if and only when water is 
available for allocation. The result is an arrangement that provides security by 
assigning 100% of the investment risk to share-holders and thereby encourages 
them to make efficient investment decisions. In order to ensure efficient use on a 
day to day basis, volumetric allocations made to shareholders are tradeable. 
There is no obligation to use an allocation. In such a regime, the opportunity to trade allocations encourages users to 
make efficient short-term water use decisions and the opportunity to trade 
shares (entitlements) encourages users to make efficient long-term investment 
decisions. In Australia, shares are issued in perpetuity and defined so that all 
water users, including aspiring ones, can increase their entitlement to a share 
of a water resource pool only by acquiring shares from an existing 
shareholder. 
In parallel with these arrangements and in order to enable efficient management 
of local externalities, a “water-use” approval must be held and, in some 
supply systems, a delivery entitlement held. Whilst the resultant 
constellation of arrangements may seem much more complicated than the 
issuance of a single licence, unbundled regimes have induced considerable 
innovation. In Australia, the economic efficiency of water use has increased 
dramatically. 
The  second design clue comes from one of the Tinbergen’s students – 
Robert Mundell – who was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics for the 
development of what has become known as the Assignment Principle. 
In essence, the Assignment Principle states that in order to maximize their 
capacity to deliver on an objective, policy makers should assign an instrument 
exclusively to the pursuit of a policy target to which it is best suited
11 and then 
never use that instrument to pursue another target. In a well-designed 
administrative regime, there is no instrument switching. Instead, each 
instrument has a specific purpose and is used only to pursue that purpose. 
Each instrument plays its role in assisting all in the search for the optimal trade-
off to be made between competing objectives or targets to be pursued. 
Instruments that operate at different scales are administered at different scales. 
On a daily basis, the right hand does not have to know what the left hand is 
doing. Each can be trusted to get on with the job (Mundell, 1960, 1962). 
By way of example, in Australia’s southern connected River Murray System, 
entitlement trading is used to encourage efficient investment and to maintain 
equity. Similarly, allocation trading is used to ensure that water use is efficient at 
any point in time. Allocations are defined by volume and readily tradeable at low 
cost. An allocation trade (temporary trade) from the state of Victoria to the state 
of South Australia can usually be completed within two days
2 (NWC, 2013) and, 
as a result, prices now respond to climatic conditions on a daily basis. This 
degree of temporal and spatial efficiency in the use of resources is possible, if 
and only if administrators can be trusted not to interfere with allocation trading 
rules, for example, to pursue an environmental or regional development 
objective. 
Derived from attempts to reduce the number of mistakes made in the pursuit of 
optimal monetary policy, Mundell’s insight focuses on the importance of deciding 
which instrument should be used for which purpose and then neither 
changing one’s mind nor being tempted to use it for two simultaneous 
objectives. In particular, these principles challenge the call for the 
                                       
1   Mundell (1962) recommended computing the ratio of the effect of each instrumentt on its 
objective and reasoned that instruments should always be assigned to the objective with the 
highest ratio. 
2   More than 90% of allocation trades into and out of South Australia are completed within ten 
days. Trades between other states in the Murray Darling Basin are faster as these regimes have 
been unbundled (NWC, 2013). development of so-called “integrated water resource management.” Integration 
is done in the market place by individual water users operating in an 
environment designed to influence the decisions they make.
3 
The use of market mechanisms, however, is possible if and only if this does not 
produce perverse outcomes – especially perverse hydrological outcomes. In the 
world of water, failures to adequately account for return flows, connectivity 
between ground and surface water systems and the capture of overland flows 
are classic perverse outcomes. 
The third design clue comes from the notion that in an ever-changing world, 
abstraction arrangements must be defined with hydrological integrity. That is, 
the arrangements must be defined in a manner that is consistent with the 
way water is stored, and how it flows across and flows through landscapes. 
In particular, it is critical that the regime take full account of return flows, 
connectivity between water resource pools and unregulated uses. 
Unbundled abstraction regimes, if specified in a manner that have  hydrological 
integrity,  incentivise  innovation.  If  specified without hydrological integrity, 
however, administrators need to intervene continuously to prevent entitlement 
holders from investing in ways that seek to increase their share of the system 
by accessing water that was previously taken by others. 
Australia, for example, has found to its immense cost, that if reductions in 
return flows and increases in the interception of over-land flows are not included 
fully in the entitlement regime, a raft of social, economic and environmental 
problems can be expected to emerge as people take advantage of opportunities 
to reduce return flows and increase interception (Young and McColl, 2003b, 
2008, 2009a). The solution is simple either  
•  entitlements need to be specified as a net entitlement – an entitlement to 
take a specified amount on the condition that a nominated proportion is 
returned back to the system; or 
•  the administrative regime used must require a periodic across the board 
reduction in allocations per share as return flows are reduced and/or 
interception increases. 
In the western United States of America, where prior appropriation abstraction 
regimes are used, return flows are specified and transfer of an abstraction 
entitlement to another entity allowed only in ways that have no adverse return 
flow and other implications (Lane-Miller et al., 2013).
4 
Australia, however, failed to learn from US attempts to manage return flows and 
has found to its immense cost that reductions in return flows and increases in 
the interception of overland flows have to be fixed. Failure to do this is one of the 
reasons that so much money has had to be spent fixing up the abstraction 
regime used in the Murray Darling Basin. The cost of fixing these and a number of 
                                       
3   A classic example of an assignment mistake is to discourage the efficient use of water by 
“taxing” entitlement and/or allocation trades in an effort to solve environmental problems in an 
over-allocated system. In all cases, it is more efficient to use a separate process that exposes all 
water users to the opportunity costs associated with water use. Examples of a separate process 
include the purchase of entitlements for the environment and/or the reduction of allocations 
made to all entitlement holders. 
4   Because return flow obligations are specified on a case by case basis and typically 
wrapped up in beneficial use doctrine the result is an arrangement that has prevented allocation 
markets from emerging. other regime design mistakes has exceeded $750,000 per irrigation business 
(Young, 2014). 
The  fourth  design  clue  comes  from  another  winner  of  a Nobel Prize in 
Economics-Ronald Coase. Coase, like Tinbergen and Mundell, was interested in 
dynamically efficient outcomes. Applied to water, the guidance that emerges from 
consideration of the Coase Theorem is that transaction costs need to be as low 
as possible (Coase, 1960). 
When transaction costs are high, equity and economic efficiency issues become 
tangled with one another. The Coase theorem makes the observation that when 
property rights are fully specified and the transaction costs associated with 
their redistribution are zero then markets can be relied upon to produce 
efficiently without impinging on the equity considerations.
5 
Applied to water resources, the resultant design guideline is that administrators 
should do everything possible to get the costs of changing the way water is 
used as close to zero as possible. 
In practice, get your transaction costs down. Audit them, bench-mark  them  and 
assign  decision  making  responsibility  so  that “recommendations” can be 
replaced with “binding” decisions. In particular, find a way to prevent third 
parties from interfering with decisions made by individuals. In a democracy, this 
is possible if, and only if, the processes involved in determining the quantity of 
water that may be taken from a system and where this water may be taken are 
specified using arrangements that are separated (unbundled) from the 
instruments used to specify entitlements and allocations. 
The fifth design clue comes from the observation that it is more efficient to 
specify entitlements so that 100% of each element of risk is assigned to one 
interest group. Risk assignment may vary from element to element but for 
dynamically efficient outcomes it is necessary always to assign 100% of that risk 
to one interest group. That interest group can then be made totally and 
completely responsible and accountable for management of that risk. If, for 
example, a water user is responsible totally for managing supply risk then their 
success will be dependent upon how well they manage that risk. Risk can also 
arise simply because it can be administratively expensive to design an 
allocation system that is perfect in every dimension. To this end, the so-called 
80/20 principle (Koch, 1998) can be useful.
6 When it comes, for example, to the 
specification of exchange rates as allocations are traded from one location to 
another some approximation is needed in order to keep transaction costs low. 
                                       
5   In his famous paper “On the problem of social cost”, Coase argued the reverse of what is 
now described as the Coase Theorem. In his paper, Coase (1960) argued that the costs of 
negotiating are “sufficiently costly . . . to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a 
world in which the pricing system worked without cost” (p.11). “In these conditions, the initial 
delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system 
operates” (p.16). 
6   There are, however, strong parallels between this concept and the so-called Pareto 
Principle. Wikipedia, for example, states that “The Pareto principle (also known as the 80–20 
rule, the law of the vital few, and the principle of factor sparsity) states that, for many events, 
roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes. Business-management consultant 
Joseph M. Juran suggested the principle and named it after Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, 
who observed in 1906 that 80% of the land in Italy was owned by 20% of the population; he 
developed the principle by observing that 20% of the pea pods in his garden contained 80% of 
the peas” (Wikipedia, 2013). When risk assignment is vague then inefficient resource use results. If, for 
example, a government has a policy of providing payments to those people who 
do not plan adequately for a drought, then that government must expect these 
people not to plan for a drought and, as a result, the adverse impacts of the 
drought on the landscape will be worse than otherwise would have been the 
case (McColl and Young, 2006, 2007). 
The sixth and last design clue comes from theories about robustness. Robust 
regimes tend to be elegant in their design and can be expected to withstand the 
test of time because, under duress, they work elegantly and can be expected 
autonomously to produce efficient, socially-acceptable outcomes (Young and 
McColl, 2003a, 2003b, 2005). Examples of robust arrangements include the 
definition of entitlements as shares that ensure that the only way one person’s 
entitlement share can be increased is either to convince someone else to reduce 
their shareholding or introduce a new resource into the system so that no-one is 
worse off as a result of a change in the number of shares held. 
Another example of a robust allocation regime is the use of double entry 
accounting arrangements so that allocations are first credited to an account and 
then debited from the account as they are either used or transferred to someone 
else. 
5. An	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠframework	 ﾠ
When viewed collectively and as summarized in Box 2, the above design clues 
can be drawn together into the elements of a guiding framework for the design of 
any abstraction regime. 
If these design clues are accepted then the first challenge is to separate system-
wide instruments from those used to man-age individual decisions. At least, 
three groups of instruments are needed, namely: 
 
1. Instruments for managing system-wide issues: like specifying the total 
amount of water that may be taken from a water body at any point in time; 
2. Instruments for defining each user’s interest: including the nature of 
each entitlement and allocations made; and 
3. Instruments for managing the impacts and consequences of use: such 
as, for example, a requirement to meter abstractions, not to pollute, etc. 
 Box  2: Principles  for  the  design  of  an  abstraction regime 
1. Unbundle – Have at least as many instruments as there are objectives and use a 
separate instrument for the pursuit of each objective. 
2. Certainty – Once an instrument has been assigned for pursuit of one objective, never 
allow it to be used to pursue another objective. 
3. Hydrological integrity – Define all entitlements and allocations in a manner that is 
consistent with the way that water is stored, flows across and through land. 
4. Facilitate trading – Keep the transaction costs associated with the transfer of 
entitlements, allocations, etc. as low as possible. 
5. Efficient investment – Fully assign all the risks associated with an entitlement, 
allocation, etc. to one entity. 
6. Robustness –  Ensure  that  the  constellation  of  interacting instruments 
and administrative arrangements is robust enough to withstand the test of time. 
 
At the system scale, catchment plans can be used to define the nature of each 
water resource pool and the abstraction regime used to determine how water 
will be distributed amongst shareholders in that pool. This same plan, or for large 
systems, a basin plan can be used to determine how connections among water 
resource pools will be managed. 
In practice, planning documents are used to determine the nature of system-
wide opportunities and, once these have been prepared the abstraction 
regime is then used to share these opportunities  among  entitlement  holders 
and  other  users.  For  this approach to work, it is critical that the wording used 
is consistent with and is nested under the planning document. 
This means that entitlements should be specified in a manner that, in effect, is 
used to partition or share opportunities to access water in a river or an aquifer. 
No entitlement should ever guarantee that a volume of water will always be 
available. Instead, the water sharing plan should be used to define how much 
water is to be allocated to entitlement holders and when these allocations will 
be made. 
Pulling all these concepts together and drawing on experience in Australia and 
in the success of the Falaj irrigation regimes developed many centuries ago, the 
state of the art in the robust design of abstraction regimes appears to involve 
the definition of entitlements as shares (Young, 2012a; al-Ghafri et al., 2013). 
Allocations in terms of volume or access time can then be made in proportion 
number of shares held by each entitlement holder. Building upon corporate 
experience, shares should be defined as unit shares so that it is possible to 
split and amalgamate a defined water resource. In practice, the resulting 
arrangements should be made as fungible as possible. That is, each sharing 
pool and all allocation pools should be made as large as possible so that costs 
associated with administering the regime can be kept as low as possible. 
Shares can be defined in one of two ways. As already mentioned, the first option 
is to define them as a “net” entitlement to the amount of water that can be 
used. In “net” entitlement regimes, account is taken of return flows and, using 
estimates contained in water sharing plans, assumptions are made about the 
proportion of water that is returned following use. Flood irrigation over a light soil, for example, can result in as much as 50% of the water taken draining back to an 
unconfined aquifer. In contrast, almost all drip irrigation tends to be lost in 
evapotranspiration with less than 10% return-flow. The main disadvantage of 
this user-by-user approach is that the cost of monitoring irrigation practice and 
adjusting each water account for return flow is expensive. 
The alternative approach, which is administratively cheaper, is to define the 
entitlements as a “gross” entitlement. Under robust “gross” entitlement 
regimes, the size of the consumptive pool is reduced as the technical 
efficiency of water use increases. This approach is much simpler and gives a 
first-mover advantage to those who are among the first to improve the technical 
efficiency of water use. 
Both approaches have hydrological integrity. Which of the two approaches – a 
gross or net entitlement regime – is more appropriate depends upon the merits 
of encouraging the rapid adoption of technically efficient technology and the 
costs of monitoring use. Under a net-entitlement regime, the individual incentive 
to become more efficient is less than is the case when the gross-entitlement 
regime is used and allocations per share decreased as the mean technical 
efficiency of water use increases.
7  
A second question – which also lacks adequate theory – is the question of 
how best to sequence water reforms. Transitional arrangements are important. 
If, for example, a volumetric allocation regime is to be used to manage scarcity 
then there is a need first to introduce meters and establish, an administrative 
regime that ensures that meters are rarely tampered with and that over-use is 
so-heavily penalized that meter tampering is a rare event (Young,2010). Careful 
consideration of governance arrangements can be critical in ensuring 
compliance. Enforcement, for example, is much easier if those attempting to 
steal water are seen to be stealing it from their fellow shareholders rather than 
from the government. 
As a regime consistent with the above framework is developed, it soon becomes 
clear that the role of a catchment or basin plan is to establish the rules by which 
water use decisions and investment decisions associated with water are made 
but NOT define how and where water is used. Amongst other things this means 
that there should be no restriction the way water is used. Water entitlements 
(shares) can then be made freely transferable and as a result those who find 
more efficient ways to manage water use can be rewarded through the market 
place. 
One of the easiest and most robust ways lock in such a suite of incentives is to 
issue entitlement shares in perpetuity. The result, as already explained, is an 
arrangement that ensures that any increase in the amount of water taken by 
one person is accompanied by an arrangement that decreases use by an 
equivalent amount else-where. Beneficial use concepts like “use it or lose it” are 
replaced with an arrangement that incentivises and rewards more efficient 
water use. 
                                       
7   In the case of Australia’s Southern Connected River Murray system, the entitlement 
issued to irrigators is a gross-entitlement. Rather than doing what was originally committed to 
and which would have encouraged efficient investment, governments have chosen to off-set the 
adverse impact of increased water-use efficiency on return flows by purchasing entitlements 
from irrigators that are willing to sell them. In practice, this approach works but, from an 
economic perspective, should be seen as a subsidy to irrigators that buys back the adverse 
consequences of inefficient investment. 6. System	 ﾠspecificity	 ﾠ
In the real world there are many types of water supply systems. Some involve 
large dams others involve the capture and, possibly, local storage of water as it 
flows past a farm or town. Groundwater systems involve different 
considerations. In Australia, abstraction regimes  that  involve  large dams and 
many control structures are called “regulated systems” because the rate of 
flow of water through these systems can be controlled (regulated). At the other 
end of the spectrum are systems that are, in essence, “unregulated” because the 
rate of flow depends upon rainfall and the degree of abstraction. 
No matter what the nature of the system and in order to facilitate low-cost 
trading, the challenge is to find a way to make entitlements and allocations as 
fungible as possible. That is, the unbundling process should be used to make 
each element in the administrative regime similar in form and structure. That is, 
every effort should be made to standardize each part of the entitlement and 
allocation regime and thereby deepen the opportunity for low-cost trading 
arrangements to emerge. 
In regulated systems and if the market is deepening benefits of fungibility are to 
be pursued, this means that all seniority allocation regimes should be converted 
into share regimes and each allocation pool made as large as possible. In 
regulated rivers, the share pool should be at least at the scale of a river reach 
and in many cases, is more appropriately defined by reference to a dam or 
collection of dams. Allocation exchange rates can be used to adjust for 
transmission losses, etc. In regulated systems the carry-forward of unused 
water from one allocation period to the next should be possible to that regime 
encourages optimal management of supply risk as well as scarcity. That is, with 
adjustment for storage losses and subject to storage capacity, it should be 
possible to carry forward unused water allocations from one period to the next 
so that water users have to think about when as well as where water should be 
used. 
In unregulated systems entitlements can still be defined as shares of a 
defined resource pool. In these systems, if allocations are defined by reference 
to the flow at the top of a reach, then volumetric conversion tables can be used to 
determine how much water may be taken at any point along that reach. Low-cost 
within-reach trading then becomes possible (Young and McColl, 2009b). 
There is also an issue related to the degree of administrative complexity that is 
appropriate. In systems where a very small pro-portion of water is being taken, 
the regime used can be simple and inexpensive to administer. As more and 
more water is taken, and if one does not wish to compromise environmental 
objectives, more complexity is needed. In addition, one must be mindful of the 
costs of administering any regime (Young, 2012a). In small systems, the fixed 
costs of running a fully unbundled share regime may not be justified. 
In large systems, there can be advantage in splitting each water pool into two or 
more priority sub-pools. A high-security, a general security and a low security 
share pool can then be set up so that supply risk can be managed at less cost 
to the investor. 
Finally and because transaction costs need to be kept low, early effort and 
investment in the development of centralized entitlement registers and water 
accounting regimes is critical. The most efficient regimes that I am aware of 
rely upon the creation of centralized entitlement registers that define “who” 
owns “what” entitlement. Under such a regime, if anyone wants to secure an entitlement to access water, the only way they can do this is to enter into a 
contract with an existing entitlement holder to change that register. 
Similarly, if a person wishes to record a financial interest in that entitlement – for 
example, by registering a mortgage, the regime should provide that the only way 
to do this is to record that interest on the register. In parallel, with this 
arrangement, the regime should make it impossible to record a third party 
interest in an allocation so that allocation trades can occur instantaneously. 
7. Concluding	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠ
In the past, most water economists and others have been wary of 
recommending a fundamental redesign of water abstraction regimes and, 
instead, have opted to focus on opportunities to make marginal improvements 
by, for example, recommending the introduction of arrangements that allow 
trade in water allocations. 
In this paper, it is suggested that, in most if not all instances, there is a strong 
case for including the re-specification of abstraction licensing arrangements in 
the suite of options to be considered. Implementation of transformation reforms 
requires careful attention to detail. Upfront investment in the development of 
new administrative capabilities is necessary and careful communication with 
stakeholders essential. When the case for change is well thought through and 
well communicated, however, the returns can be significant. Abstraction regime 
revision is not an easy process. Without great care, massive mistake can be 
made and those with a vested interest in the existing regime can be expected to 
oppose change at every step in the process. Further research on reform 
sequencing and implementation is needed (Young, 2014). 
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